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5Oil and Twenty-First Century  
Socialism in Latin America:  
Venezuela and Ecuador
Hugo Chavez, since first becoming president of Venezuela in January 1999, has pursued an active and influence-seekng foreign policy, involving both oil and non-oil 
aspects. He has clearly aimed to enable Venezuela to ‘punch 
above its weight’ internationally and has succeeded, at least for 
now. Chavez’s name recognition internationally is probably higher 
than any Venezuelan since Bolivar. He has played a leading role 
in a significant process of political realignment in both OPEC and 
Latin America as a whole, significantly reducing the diplomatic 
isolation of Cuba, and has become a significant thorn in the side 
of the US government. Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, more recently in power and president of a 
smaller country, has been something of a lieutenant to Chavez though occasionally taking a 
different line on particular issues.
VEnEzUELA And ECUAdOR: THREE dimEnSiOnS Of OiL POLiTiCS
Both governments have adopted politically striking domestic resource-rent policies. They both 
have to satisfy domestic electorates which in both countries – and particularly Venezuela – are 
acutely aware that national oil wealth exists and whose expectations of redistribution are high. 
Yet it is not at all easy to turn oil revenue into sustained development or even to raise standards 
of living for the majority of the population. The failure of their predecessor governments in 
these respects played a major part in the rise of Chavez and Correa in the first place. Voters, 
unhappy with the performance of a series of governments, turned to more radical figures 
out of a deep sense of frustration. Since then Chavez, in particular, has been the unexpected 
beneficiary of much higher oil prices since 2004 and he has proved a determined redistributor of 
income and wealth. Correa has had less money and less time in office, but he has moved policy 
in a similar direction. Both figures have benefited from the perception, which is not without 
foundation, that they have sought to use these resource rents for the benefit of the majority of 
their populations and that they are less socially exclusionary than their predecessors.
At the same time, both countries face specific domestic and external challenges in their oil 
sectors. The Venezuelan and Ecuadorian economies depend heavily on oil and gas exports, 
which provide the material foundations for both their foreign and domestic radicalism. in 
terms of export income, Venezuela and Ecuador are the most oil dependent countries in the 
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6region, with the corollary that they are the least dependent on the performance of their non-oil 
economies. Worryingly, though, Venezuelan oil and gas exports are currently in decline, partly as 
the result of long term trends and partly because of Chavez’s style of government. Ecuadorian 
oil exports are not really in decline in the same way but they are likely to grow only slowly while 
domestic consumption may grow faster. Some 40 percent of Ecuadorian oil is now consumed 
domestically and the figure for Venezuela is nearly 30 percent. domestic prices are very low in 
both cases and some oil listed under ‘domestic consumption’ may well have been smuggled to 
Colombia, whose oil consumption appears suspiciously low, and also to Guyana. international 
oil prices have risen significantly in the past decade, which has more than offset –for now at 
least – the consequences of stagnant or falling production. These issues point to a important 
and growing area of vulnerability in both countries.
A key question, for the future, therefore, is whether stagnant oil production represents Chavez’s 
and – to some extent – Correa’s feet of clay. Although the statistics are to a degree opaque, 
it does not appear that Venezuela has sufficient financial resources to cope with low oil prices 
without hardship. This potential vulnerability seems even greater in the case of Ecuador, which 
is a dollarised economy that has recently defaulted on part of its government debt. The Stalinist 
system relied on by the Cuban authorities to cope with the politics of economic decline in 
that country does not seem available to either Chavez or Correa, who risk electoral defeat if 
economic setback impacts on their domestic popularity – as to some extent it seems bound to 
do. At the very least, Chavez may have to scale down some of his international ambitions if 
the Venezuelan economy turns down, especially since there is no strong evidence that these 
international ambitions are popular within Venezuela itself.
OiL PROdUCTiOn in VEnEzUELA And ECUAdOR
This pattern of broadly stagnant oil production and declining exports is overwhelmingly not 
the result of any shortage of oil reserves. The main factor is an insufficiency in the quantity and 
quality of investment. Private investment has been held back, in part, by widespread distrust of 
the transnational oil companies that dominated the world oil industry up until the 1970s and 
who still tend to be viewed as ‘imperialists’. This is so despite the fact that the big US companies 
such as Exxon-mobil no longer play much of a role in either Ecuador or Venezuela. it is true that 
there is a major lawsuit between the Ecuadorian government and Chevron to do with ecological 
pollution in Amazonia but Chevron is no longer a current producer in Ecuador either. in fact, 
the international oil market has deconcentrated to the point that oil producing governments 
face a significant range of choice in the companies with which they wish to deal. The issue of 
‘oil imperialism’ – real enough in much of the twentieth century – is therefore less salient than it 
was. Even so, foreign- and particularly US-owned oil companies remain unpopular.
7more importantly, PdVSA – Venezuela’s state 
owned oil company – has tended to under-
invest and is increasingly subject to day-
to-day political considerations. it seems to 
have failed to establish mutually-respectful 
relationships with the specialist oil technology 
companies that do much of the actual work of 
oil exploration and abstraction. in 2009 there 
were several high-profile conflicts involving 
the Venezuelan governments and some of 
these specialist contractors who claimed that 
they had not been paid for many months. 
Some of these were nationalised but it is not 
clear how this will solve the problem.
This is a relatively new issue. Prior to the arrival 
in power of Chavez, successive Venezuelan 
governments allowed a high degree of public 
investment managed by a largely autonomous 
PdVSA. indeed there was a widespread 
feeling in Venezuela that the autonomy of the 
state company PdVSA had gone too far. 
it is noteworthy that in the Venezuelan 
elections of 1998 both Chavez and miguel 
Rodriguez, a market-reforming independent 
presidential candidate, both pledged to 
restrain the state company.
Reining in PdVSA made good political sense 
but there was a management problem. State 
oil companies find it difficult to prevent 
clientelism, politicisation and performance 
problems. This is not a universal truth since 
some state oil companies have markedly 
better records than others, but PdVSA has 
certainly lost efficiency since Chavez took 
office. This is largely because it lost a great 
deal of its human capital following the anti-
Chavez strikes of 2002 and 2003.
Overall, Venezuelan oil production has fallen 
considerably since peaking in 1970. Continuing 
population growth makes the tendency even 
more pronounced in per capita terms and 
rising domestic consumption has also cut 
into the remaining export surplus. While 
there is some dispute over what Venezuelan 
oil production currently is, the lower estimate 
(iEA 2010) is that production fell to around 
2.2 million barrels per day in late 2009. if 
one takes this figure as accurate then per 
capita Venezuelan oil exports in volume terms 
amount to no more than 15 percent of what 
they were when production reached its all-
time high in 1970. furthermore there has 
been little if any real increase in Venezuelan 
non-oil exports in the intervening period. 
This is partly because of the ‘dutch disease’ 
effect of higher international oil prices leading 
to an over-valued domestic currency, and partly 
because of worsened diplomatic relations 
with both Colombia and the United States. 
if, as is possible, problems with electricity 
supply impact significantly on the aluminium-
processing industry during 2010 then 
these, too, will further reduce Venezuela’s 
non-oil exports.
A further factor holding back production 
in Venezuela has been OPEC-mandated 
restrictions. These impact to some extent on 
Ecuador but matter much more in the case 
of Venezuela. They can of course be seen 
as part of a potentially worthwhile trade 
off between lower production and higher 
prices. There has indeed been a considerable 
increase in international oil price levels since 
the beginning of the 1970s when Venezuelan 
oil production peaked. Several Venezuelan 
8governments, including Chavez, have played an active part in achieving this by helping to 
engineer international production cuts at critical times. However if currently high international 
prices are not sustained, Venezuela seems acutely vulnerable. 
The Venezuelan government has recently responded to its chronic lack of investment by seeking 
to attract capital from newcomer companies. it is too early to say whether this policy will prove 
successful. The amount of investment now required to turn around the oil industry is very large 
and lead times in the sector are quite long. Even so, fresh sources of foreign capital are probably 
Venezuela’s last chance to avoid really serious economic problems in the medium-term.
Ecuador faces a different set of policy dilemmas. its oil production has increased unevenly since 
it first became a significant oil exporter in 1972. Pipeline construction and maintenance have 
been key to this process since most of the country’s oil reserves lie to the east of the Andes. 
Today, Ecuador has two pipeline systems – one built in the early 1970s and the other started 
operations in 2003 – plus a spur line that connects Ecuador with Colombia. it is unlikely that an 
extra pipeline complex will be built anytime soon, as a result of which potential oil production 
growth is limited. meanwhile domestic oil consumption is continuing to increase.
much of Ecuador’s oil production is in the hands of the state oil company but the technical 
capacity of this company is limited. The most significant oil politics in Ecuador comes from the 
‘traditional’ situation in which the host government seeks to improve its share of the gross 
revenues earned by private companies. This is, in principle, quite an old story and a usual one 
among the vast majority of oil exporting countries. it does however seem that Correa has played 
the role of revenue-maximising host government quite skilfully in the short term. He was able 
in most cases to change the legal terms on which the companies worked from concessionaires 
(who might have a legal claim to the oil resources themselves) to subcontractors, simply 
rewarded f or work put in. He did this by using the diversity of private operating companies to 
pressure them sequentially and prevent a united front from forming. moreover, by threatening 
a windfall tax of 99 percent on concessionaire profits, he was able to make the idea of service 
contracts relatively attractive in comparison. What he has not been able to do, though, has been 
to attract any significant fresh foreign investment into the oil industry. Production has started to 
tend downwards as a result. 
Ecuador has however floated the idea that the international community should compensate 
the government for agreeing not to allow oil or mining investment into areas of natural beauty 
inhabited by indigenous peoples. it is estimated that there are some 850 million barrels of oil 
located under the Yasuni national Park. The Ecuadorian government has asked for a kind of 
rental from aid donors in return for not drilling in the area. While not completely rejecting the 
idea, the main donors (mostly European governments) have been prepared to offer much less 
money than the Ecuadorian government was expecting. disappointment with the progress of 
these negotiations led to the resignation of the Ecuadorian foreign minister in January 2010. 
9meanwhile indigenous groups have taken 
legal action against Chevron for compensation 
as a result of environmental damage in the 
course of oil extraction. There has certainly 
been such damage, and large sums of money 
are in contention, but the company denies 
liability and the case is currently continuing. 
VEnEzUELAn nATURAL GAS
One possible way of increasing resource 
income would be for Venezuela to develop 
its gas reserves. These, like its oil reserves, 
are abundant and there is no problem with 
OPEC quota restrictions. However, what 
has held Venezuelan production back 
has been the unwillingness of its potential 
partners to enter into long term commitments 
with Venezuela in view of the heavy financing 
costs that these imply and the resulting 
political risk. during the Chavez’s presidency, 
there were negotiations involving Shell and 
mitsubishi over the so-called mariscal Sucre 
LnG project but the private companies 
eventually pulled out over disagreements 
about financing. Subsequent negotiations 
between PdVSA and Petrobras over the 
same project also failed. The official reason 
given in the latter case was that Petrobras 
was unwilling to agree to devote as much of 
the project to providing gas cheaply to the 
domestic Venezuelan market as Chavez had 
wanted. However, the dramatic nationalisation 
of Brazilian gas interests in Bolivia in 2006 
– for which the Brazilian authorities mostly 
blamed Chavez – may have been a factor in 
discouraging the Brazilians from committing 
large financial resources to Venezuela. 
in 2006 Chavez also proposed an enormous 
trans-hemispheric gas pipeline to take gas 
from Venezuela to Brazil and Argentina but 
this too was abandoned due to a lack of 
support from Brazil, which blamed financing 
difficulties. in fact, despite Venezuela’s 
abundant supplies of natural gas reserves 
and genuine willingness to develop them, 
the only significant gas project completed 
under Chavez has been a pipeline through 
which Venezuela has been importing gas 
from Colombia. Venezuela remains interested 
in developing LnG capacity and there remain 
some possibilities in that regard.
VEnEzUELAn OiL diPLOmACY:  
OPEC And ALBA
There is a marked and dramatic disjunction 
between this rather downbeat picture of 
Venezuela’s oil and gas production and the 
remarkably effective international diplomacy 
pursued by Chavez. There are some different 
facets of this diplomacy. Some of it is 
markedly driven by ideology, such as the close 
relationship with Cuba, Bolivia and the fARC 
in Colombia. The latter is essentially secret but 
was important enough to underlie a serious 
war scare with Colombia at the end of 2009. 
At the other extreme is Petrocaribe, which is 
‘ideology lite’ and whose seventeen members 
include the vast majority of countries in 
Central America and the Caribbean. There are 
only a few notable non-members including 
Trinidad and Tobago which has oil production 
of its own.
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Petrocaribe is an elaboration of the San Jose Pact, originally agreed between mexico and 
Venezuela in 1980, according to which these oil exporters provided oil at subsidised prices to 
the oil importing countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Petrocaribe was set up by 
Venezuela in 2005 and in its present form it is an arrangement by which Venezuela provides 
oil at concessionary rates to Petrocaribe members, with the concessionary element mainly 
comprised of extended terms of credit at very low interest rates. Although there are some 
variances, most arrangements require importers to pay 65 percent of the cost of oil imports 
reasonably promptly and the rest within 25 years at 1 percent interest rates. Cuba is the most 
important single beneficiary of the arrangement but total exports to the region have been 
estimated at some 300,000 barrels per day. This is a significant but not enormous resource 
cost and gives Venezuela some ‘soft power’ with which to compete with the US in influencing 
small countries whose diplomatic role is based on the fact that they can vote in international 
organisations.
Venezuela’s role in ALBA in 2004 is more overtly political and clearly represents an attempt to use 
the oil weapon to enhance Venezuela’s diplomatic profile. Chavez originally proposed ALBA as 
an alternative to the ‘free trade of the Americas’ initiative led by the US government. initially the 
only members were Venezuela and Cuba. it was not initially formally organised, instead taking 
the form of a kind of club made up of left-of-centre governments. in 2008, though, ALBA set 
up a bank (mainly financed by Venezuela) that afforded soft loans to member organisations. 
ALBA membership then extended to a number of small countries in the Caribbean as well as to 
Bolivia and Ecuador. At the end of 2009 ALBA members acted as a group to make their views 
heard at the Copenhagen conference on global warming.
 
COnCLUSiOnS
Chavez’s occasionally wild flights of rhetoric should not obscure his commitment to organisation 
and his talent for using broad issues to win and reinforce diplomatic support. There is little 
doubt that he finds participation in international politics rewarding for its own sake, but it may 
also be that he looks for international support as a means of influencing the political process 
within Venezuela itself. Chavez narrowly survived a coup attempt in 2002 and he is not the 
only political leader to hope that international backing may protect him from internal enemies 
–however questionable this may appear in practice. Whatever his motives, he does see himself 
as the leader of some kind of anti-US coalition and has been able occasionally to embarrass the 
US government even without causing much lasting damage. He has done this at a financial cost 
that up to now has seemed affordable. 
nevertheless, although ‘twenty-first century socialism’ may be bold it is precariously based. 
There is a case that Venezuelan oil and gas production faces a prospect of declining export 
revenue, which Chavez’s international showmanship is obscuring rather than resolving. ■
